YesGov

GOVERNMENT DOMAIN SECURITY REPORT

# portorford.org

City of Port Orford, Oregon · Population 1,135

Checked October 21, 2026 at 1:51 AM UTC · Check ID 0e4c6939-821f-4199-b823-39b5a92ad06d

**C-**

**7** of 16 checks passed **Residents are exposed**

Basic protections recommended by CISA are missing. Each fix below is a standard setting, listed in order of risk to residents.



● 7 passed ● 1 needs attention ● 8 missing

| Website | Email | DNS and domain |
|---|---|---|
| 4 of 8 | 2 of 5 | 1 of 3 |

### Not on a .gov domain

portorford.org is not a .gov address. Anyone can register a look-alike .com or .org, so residents cannot tell from the address alone that this is the official site.

**CISA and DHS advise that .gov is a requirement for secure government, trusted communication and public trust. Every day on a non-.gov address is a day residents can be fooled by an impostor site or email.**

## What to fix first

In order of risk to residents. Each is a one-time setting that then needs to be watched.

1. **Repair the SPF record** — HIGH RISK

   Receiving mail systems cannot tell the agency's real email from a forgery, so residents can receive fake notices in its name.

   **Fixed by: Your email or DNS provider**

2. **Turn on DNSSEC** — HIGH RISK

   DNS answers are not signed. A forged answer can send residents to a fake payment page, or redirect the agency's email, with no visible sign.

   **Fixed by: Your DNS host and domain registrar**

3. **Turn on HSTS** — MEDIUM

   On public Wi-Fi, a resident's visit can be pushed to an unencrypted copy of the site.

   **Fixed by: Your web host**

4 **Require encrypted mail delivery (MTA-STS)** MEDIUM
Mail sent to agency staff can be forced onto an unencrypted connection and read in transit.
**Fixed by: Your email or DNS provider**

5 **Turn on mail encryption reports (TLS-RPT)** MEDIUM
Nobody is told when encrypted mail delivery to the agency fails or is tampered with.
**Fixed by: Your DNS provider**

6 **Add framing protection** MEDIUM
The site can be hidden inside a hostile page to trick residents into clicking buttons they cannot see.
**Fixed by: Your web host**

7 **Add file type protection** MEDIUM
Browsers may guess file types, which can let an uploaded file run as code against visitors.
**Fixed by: Your web host**

8 **Publish a security contact (security.txt)** MEDIUM
People who find a security problem have no standard way to tell the agency before it is misused.
**Fixed by: Your web host**

9 **Add IPv6 support** MEDIUM
Networks that only use IPv6, including some mobile carriers, cannot reach the site directly.
**Fixed by: Your web host**

## All results in detail

Every record and value we saw, grouped by area. Written for your IT team, readable by anyone.

### Website — 4 of 8 passed

**HTTPS certificate** PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Issued by | **YE2** |
| Issued to | ***.portorford.org** |
| Expires | **December 28, 2026 (68 days after this check)** |
| TLS version | **TLSv1.3** |

**Redirect to HTTPS** PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| HTTPS available | **Yes** |
| Plain address redirects to HTTPS | **Yes** |

**HSTS** MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| HSTS header | **Not sent** |

**What this means:** On public Wi-Fi, a resident's visit can be pushed to an unencrypted copy of the site.
**How to fix:** Send the Strict-Transport-Security header with a max-age of at least one year. (Your web host)

### Certificate trust and match — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Trusted chain | Yes |
| Strong public key | Yes |
| Valid signature | Yes |
| Name matches domain | Yes |

### CAA record — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| CAA record | Found |
| Authorities named | Not captured in this scan |

### Framing protection — MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| X-Frame-Options | Not sent |

**What this means:** The site can be hidden inside a hostile page to trick residents into clicking buttons they cannot see.

**How to fix:** Send the header X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN, or a Content-Security-Policy with frame-ancestors 'self'. (Your web host)

### File type protection — MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| X-Content-Type-Options | Not sent |

**What this means:** Browsers may guess file types, which can let an uploaded file run as code against visitors.

**How to fix:** Send the header X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff. (Your web host)

### Security contact (security.txt) — MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| /.well-known/security.txt | Not found |

**What this means:** People who find a security problem have no standard way to tell the agency before it is misused.

**How to fix:** Publish /.well-known/security.txt with a contact address and an expiry date. (Your web host)

## Email — 2 of 5 passed

### SPF — NEEDS ATTENTION

| | |
|---|---|
| Record | `v=spf1 ip4:216.222.196.223 ip4:204.44.192.75 +mx +a include:relay.mailchannels.net ~all` |
| Ending | Soft fail (~all) |

**What this means:** Receiving mail systems cannot tell the agency's real email from a forgery, so residents can receive fake notices in its name.

**How to fix:** Publish one TXT record that lists every service sending mail for the domain and ends in -all. (Your email or DNS provider)

### DKIM — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Selectors found | default |

### DMARC — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Policy | quarantine |
| Reports sent to | jharrison@portorford.org |
| Record | `v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:jharrison@portorford.org` |

### MTA-STS — MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| DNS record | Not found |
| Policy file | Not found |
| Enforced | No |

**What this means:** Mail sent to agency staff can be forced onto an unencrypted connection and read in transit.

**How to fix:** Publish an _mta-sts TXT record and a policy file at mta-sts.(domain)/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. (Your email or DNS provider)

### TLS-RPT — MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| TLS-RPT record | Not found |

**What this means:** Nobody is told when encrypted mail delivery to the agency fails or is tampered with.

**How to fix:** Publish a TXT record at _smtp._tls with an address to receive reports. (Your DNS provider)

## DNS and domain — 1 of 3 passed

### DNSSEC — MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| Zone signed | No |
| Result | No DNSSEC records found. DNSSEC may not be enabled for this domain. |

**What this means:** DNS answers are not signed. A forged answer can send residents to a fake payment page, or redirect the agency's email, with no visible sign.

**How to fix:** Turn on DNSSEC signing at the DNS host, then add the DS record at the registrar. (Your DNS host and domain registrar)

### IPv6 — MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| Website reachable over IPv6 | No |
| Name servers reachable over IPv6 | Yes |

**What this means:** Networks that only use IPv6, including some mobile carriers, cannot reach the site directly.

**How to fix:** Ask the host for an IPv6 address and publish an AAAA record for the site. (Your web host)

### RPKI route protection — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Website route signed | Yes |
| Website route valid | Yes |
| Name server route valid | Yes |

### .gov domain — NOT SCORED

| | |
|---|---|
| Ends in .gov | No |

**What this means:** Anyone can register a look-alike .com or .org, so residents have no way to confirm this is the official site. Every .gov request is verified by CISA.


## Hosting and platform

Informational, not scored

| | |
|---|---|
| Website server | **216.222.196.223** |
| Mail server | **mail.portorford.org** |
| Website server reputation | **Not on abuse lists** |
| Mail server blocklists | **Not listed** |
| WordPress | **Yes, version 7.1.3** |
| Email addresses published on the site | **1** |
| Broken links found | **1** |
| Referrer policy header | **No** |

## Progress over time

Checks passed at each scan, oldest to newest. Highest possible is 16.




### If these basics were missed, what else has been missed?

These are published CISA standards that any IT department or provider can check in seconds. YesGov can fix all 9 in under 24 hours, re-run this check to prove it, and keep watching every day. The move to .gov takes 1 to 2 weeks because CISA verifies each request; security fixes on the current domain do not wait for it.

**yesgov.com/contact · (888) 777-0017 · info@yesgov.com**

## How we check

We only check settings that any computer on the internet can see: DNS records, certificates, web headers and mail policies. We never log in to, scan or probe any agency system. The 16 checks build on CISA Binding Operational Directive 18-01 and other published internet standards. Full method: yesgov.com/open-data#how-we-grade.

### Verify this report online

Scan the code or visit the address below to see these results, check the domain again and get alerts when anything changes.

https://yesgov.com/check/portorford--org?check=0e4c6939-821f-4199-b823-39b5a92ad06d

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