YesGov

GOVERNMENT DOMAIN SECURITY REPORT

# ithacami.com

City of Ithaca, Michigan · Population 2,813

Checked October 26, 2026 at 6:39 PM UTC · Check ID 309d9e09-7ebf-416d-b143-92cb81d7aa0f

**B**

**11** of 16 checks passed **Needs attention**

The basics are in place, but several standard protections are missing. The list below is in order of risk to residents.



11 passed · 5 missing

| Website | Email | DNS and domain |
|---|---|---|
| 6 of 8 | 3 of 5 | 2 of 3 |

### Not on a .gov domain

ithacami.com is not a .gov address. Anyone can register a look-alike .com or .org, so residents cannot tell from the address alone that this is the official site.

**CISA and DHS advise that .gov is a requirement for secure government, trusted communication and public trust. Every day on a non-.gov address is a day residents can be fooled by an impostor site or email.**

## What to fix first

In order of risk to residents. Each is a one-time setting that then needs to be watched.

1. **Turn on DNSSEC** — HIGH RISK

   DNS answers are not signed. A forged answer can send residents to a fake payment page, or redirect the agency's email, with no visible sign.

   **Fixed by: Your DNS host and domain registrar**

2. **Require encrypted mail delivery (MTA-STS)** — MEDIUM

   Mail sent to agency staff can be forced onto an unencrypted connection and read in transit.

   **Fixed by: Your email or DNS provider**

3. **Turn on mail encryption reports (TLS-RPT)** — MEDIUM

   Nobody is told when encrypted mail delivery to the agency fails or is tampered with.

   **Fixed by: Your DNS provider**

4 **Add a CAA record** MEDIUM

Any certificate authority in the world may issue a certificate for this domain, which makes impersonating the site easier.

**Fixed by: Your DNS provider**

5 **Publish a security contact (security.txt)** MEDIUM

People who find a security problem have no standard way to tell the agency before it is misused.

**Fixed by: Your web host**

# All results in detail

Every record and value we saw, grouped by area. Written for your IT team, readable by anyone.

## Website 6 of 8 passed

### HTTPS certificate PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Issued by | **YE1** |
| Issued to | **ithacami.com** |
| Expires | **January 15, 2027 (81 days after this check)** |
| TLS version | **TLSv1.3** |

### Redirect to HTTPS PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| HTTPS available | **Yes** |
| Plain address redirects to HTTPS | **Yes** |

### HSTS PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| HSTS header | **Sent** |
| Max age | **31,536,000 seconds** |
| Includes subdomains | **No** |

### Certificate trust and match PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Trusted chain | **Yes** |
| Strong public key | **Yes** |
| Valid signature | **Yes** |
| Name matches domain | **Yes** |

### CAA record MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| CAA record | **Not found** |

**What this means:** Any certificate authority in the world may issue a certificate for this domain, which makes impersonating the site easier.

**How to fix:** Publish a CAA record naming the authority you use, for example 0 issue "letsencrypt.org". (Your DNS provider)

### Framing protection — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| X-Frame-Options | SAMEORIGIN |

### File type protection — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| X-Content-Type-Options | nosniff |

### Security contact (security.txt) — MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| /.well-known/security.txt | Not found |

**What this means:** People who find a security problem have no standard way to tell the agency before it is misused.
**How to fix:** Publish /.well-known/security.txt with a contact address and an expiry date. (Your web host)

## Email — 3 of 5 passed

### SPF — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Record | `v=spf1 ip4:66.219.117.18 ip4:66.219.117.2 ip4:64.25.207.133 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:spf.mtaroutes.com include:spf.constantcontact.com -all` |
| Ending | Strict (-all) |

### DKIM — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Selectors found | selector1 |

### DMARC — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Policy | reject |
| Reports sent to | dmarc@itright.com |
| Record | `v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc@itright.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc@itright.com; fo=1;` |

### MTA-STS — MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| DNS record | Not found |
| Policy file | Not found |
| Enforced | No |

**What this means:** Mail sent to agency staff can be forced onto an unencrypted connection and read in transit.
**How to fix:** Publish an _mta-sts TXT record and a policy file at mta-sts.(domain)/.well-known/mta-sts.txt. (Your email or DNS provider)

### TLS-RPT — MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| TLS-RPT record | Not found |

**What this means:** Nobody is told when encrypted mail delivery to the agency fails or is tampered with.
**How to fix:** Publish a TXT record at _smtp._tls with an address to receive reports. (Your DNS provider)

## DNS and domain — 2 of 3 passed

### DNSSEC — MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| Zone signed | No |
| Result | No DNSSEC records found. DNSSEC may not be enabled for this domain. |

**What this means:** DNS answers are not signed. A forged answer can send residents to a fake payment page, or redirect the agency's email, with no visible sign.

**How to fix:** Turn on DNSSEC signing at the DNS host, then add the DS record at the registrar. (Your DNS host and domain registrar)

### IPv6 — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Website reachable over IPv6 | Yes |
| Website IPv6 addresses | 2606:4700:3031::ac43:a566, 2606:4700:3032::6815:51e2 |
| Name servers reachable over IPv6 | Yes |

### RPKI route protection — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Website route signed | Yes |
| Website route valid | Yes |
| Name server route valid | Yes |

### .gov domain — NOT SCORED

| | |
|---|---|
| Ends in .gov | No |

**What this means:** Anyone can register a look-alike .com or .org, so residents have no way to confirm this is the official site. Every .gov request is verified by CISA.

## Hosting and platform

Informational, not scored

| | |
|---|---|
| Website server | 172.67.165.102 |
| Mail server | mx1.mtaroutes.com |
| Website server reputation | Not on abuse lists |
| Mail server blocklists | Not listed |
| WordPress | Not detected |
| Email addresses published on the site | 0 |
| Broken links found | 0 |
| Referrer policy header | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |

## Progress over time

Checks passed at each scan, oldest to newest. Highest possible is 16.




### If these basics were missed, what else has been missed?

These are published CISA standards that any IT department or provider can check in seconds. YesGov can fix all 5 in under 24 hours, re-run this check to prove it, and keep watching every day. The move to .gov takes 1 to 2 weeks because CISA verifies each request; security fixes on the current domain do not wait for it.

**yesgov.com/contact · (888) 777-0017 · info@yesgov.com**

## How we check

We only check settings that any computer on the internet can see: DNS records, certificates, web headers and mail policies. We never log in to, scan or probe any agency system. The 16 checks build on CISA Binding Operational Directive 18-01 and other published internet standards. Full method: yesgov.com/open-data#how-we-grade.

### Verify this report online

Scan the code or visit the address below to see these results, check the domain again and get alerts when anything changes.

https://yesgov.com/check/ithacami--com?check=309d9e09-7ebf-416d-b143-92cb81d7aa0f

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