YesGov

GOVERNMENT DOMAIN SECURITY REPORT

# flypib.com

Hattiesburg-Laurel Regional Airport Authority, Mississippi

Checked November 18, 2026 at 7:22 PM UTC · Check ID d8a393e6-12c0-4e7d-b62c-87ee18afbdb8

**B**

**11** of 16 checks passed **Needs attention**

The basics are in place, but several standard protections are missing. The list below is in order of risk to residents.



11 passed · 2 need attention · 3 missing

| Website | Email | DNS and domain |
|---|---|---|
| 6 of 8 | 3 of 5 | 2 of 3 |

### Not on a .gov domain

flypib.com is not a .gov address. Anyone can register a look-alike .com or .org, so residents cannot tell from the address alone that this is the official site.

**CISA and DHS advise that .gov is a requirement for secure government, trusted communication and public trust. Every day on a non-.gov address is a day residents can be fooled by an impostor site or email.**

## What to fix first

In order of risk to residents. Each is a one-time setting that then needs to be watched.

1. **Repair the SPF record** — HIGH RISK

   Receiving mail systems cannot tell the agency's real email from a forgery, so residents can receive fake notices in its name.

   **Fixed by: Your email or DNS provider**

2. **Enforce MTA-STS** — MEDIUM

   MTA-STS is set up but not enforced, so mail to agency staff can still be forced onto an unencrypted connection.

   **Fixed by: Your email or DNS provider**

3. **Add a CAA record** — MEDIUM

   Any certificate authority in the world may issue a certificate for this domain, which makes impersonating the site easier.

   **Fixed by: Your DNS provider**

4 **Publish a security contact (security.txt)** MEDIUM

People who find a security problem have no standard way to tell the agency before it is misused.

**Fixed by: Your web host**

5 **Add IPv6 support** MEDIUM

Networks that only use IPv6, including some mobile carriers, cannot reach the site directly.

**Fixed by: Your web host**

## All results in detail

Every record and value we saw, grouped by area. Written for your IT team, readable by anyone.

### Website — 6 of 8 passed

#### HTTPS certificate — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Issued by | **WE1** |
| Issued to | **flypib.com** |
| Expires | **January 30, 2027 (72 days after this check)** |
| TLS version | **TLSv1.3** |

#### Redirect to HTTPS — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| HTTPS available | **Yes** |
| Plain address redirects to HTTPS | **Yes** |

#### HSTS — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| HSTS header | **Sent** |
| Max age | **31,536,000 seconds** |
| Includes subdomains | **Yes** |

#### Certificate trust and match — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Trusted chain | **Yes** |
| Strong public key | **Yes** |
| Valid signature | **Yes** |
| Name matches domain | **Yes** |

#### CAA record — MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| CAA record | **Not found** |

**What this means:** Any certificate authority in the world may issue a certificate for this domain, which makes impersonating the site easier.

**How to fix:** Publish a CAA record naming the authority you use, for example 0 issue "letsencrypt.org". (Your DNS provider)

#### Framing protection — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| X-Frame-Options | **SAMEORIGIN** |

### File type protection — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| X-Content-Type-Options | nosniff |

### Security contact (security.txt) — MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| /.well-known/security.txt | Not found |

**What this means:** People who find a security problem have no standard way to tell the agency before it is misused.

**How to fix:** Publish /.well-known/security.txt with a contact address and an expiry date. (Your web host)

## Email — 3 of 5 passed

### SPF — NEEDS ATTENTION

| | |
|---|---|
| Record | `v=spf1 include:zohomail.com ~all` |
| Ending | Soft fail (~all) |

**What this means:** Receiving mail systems cannot tell the agency's real email from a forgery, so residents can receive fake notices in its name.

**How to fix:** Publish one TXT record that lists every service sending mail for the domain and ends in -all. (Your email or DNS provider)

### DKIM — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Selectors found | zoho |

### DMARC — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Policy | quarantine |
| Reports sent to | da20b232edb1407493f0a970e69ffccc@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net |
| Record | `v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; rua=mailto:da20b232edb1407493f0a970e69ffccc@dmarc-reports.cloudflare.net,mailto:35a8e406d060.a@dmarcinput.com; ruf=mailto:35a8e406d060.f@dmarcinput.com; fo=1` |

### MTA-STS — NEEDS ATTENTION

| | |
|---|---|
| DNS record | Found |
| Policy file | Found |
| Mode | testing |
| Enforced | No |

**What this means:** MTA-STS is set up but not enforced, so mail to agency staff can still be forced onto an unencrypted connection.

**How to fix:** Fix any problems listed for the policy file, publish the _mta-sts TXT record, and set the policy mode to enforce. (Your email or DNS provider)

### TLS-RPT — PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Record | `v=TLSRPTv1; rua=mailto:35a8e406d060.m@dmarcinput.com` |

## DNS and domain 2 of 3 passed

### DNSSEC PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Zone signed | Yes |
| Result | DNSKEY records found |

### IPv6 MISSING

| | |
|---|---|
| Website reachable over IPv6 | No |
| Name servers reachable over IPv6 | Yes |

**What this means:** Networks that only use IPv6, including some mobile carriers, cannot reach the site directly.
**How to fix:** Ask the host for an IPv6 address and publish an AAAA record for the site. (Your web host)

### RPKI route protection PASS

| | |
|---|---|
| Website route signed | Yes |
| Website route valid | Yes |
| Name server route valid | Yes |

### .gov domain NOT SCORED

| | |
|---|---|
| Ends in .gov | No |

**What this means:** Anyone can register a look-alike .com or .org, so residents have no way to confirm this is the official site. Every .gov request is verified by CISA.

### Hosting and platform

Informational, not scored

| | |
|---|---|
| Website server | 104.21.4.12 |
| Mail server | mx.zoho.com |
| Website server reputation | Not on abuse lists |
| Mail server blocklists | Not listed |
| WordPress | Yes, version 7.1.5 |
| Email addresses published on the site | 0 |
| Broken links found | 2 |
| Referrer policy header | strict-origin-when-cross-origin |

## Progress over time

Checks passed at each scan, oldest to newest. Highest possible is 16.



## If these basics were missed, what else has been missed?

These are published CISA standards that any IT department or provider can check in seconds. YesGov can fix all 5 in under 24 hours, re-run this check to prove it, and keep watching every day. The move to .gov takes 1 to 2 weeks because CISA verifies each request; security fixes on the current domain do not wait for it.

**yesgov.com/contact · (888) 777-0017 · info@yesgov.com**

## How we check

We only check settings that any computer on the internet can see: DNS records, certificates, web headers and mail policies. We never log in to, scan or probe any agency system. The 16 checks build on CISA Binding Operational Directive 18-01 and other published internet standards. Full method: yesgov.com/open-data#how-we-grade.

### Verify this report online

Scan the code or visit the address below to see these results, check the domain again and get alerts when anything changes.

https://yesgov.com/check/flypib--com?check=d8a393e6-12c0-4e7d-b62c-87ee18afbdb8

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